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Abstract—We advance a hypothesis that creativity has evolved with evolution of internal 
representations, possibly from amniotes to primates, and further in human cultural evolution. 
Representations separated sensing from acting and gave “internal room” for creativity. To see (or 
perform any sensing), creatures with internal representations had to modify these representations 
to fit sensor signals. Therefore the knowledge instinct, KI, the drive to fit representations to the 
world, had to evolve along with internal representations. Until primates, it remained simple, 
without language internal representations could not evolve from perceptions to abstract 
representations, and abstract thoughts were not possible. We consider creative vs. non-creative 
decision making, and compare KI with Kahneman-Tversky’s heuristic thinking. We identify 
higher, conscious levels of KI with the drive for creativity (DC) and discuss the roles of language 
and music, brain mechanisms involved, and experimental directions for testing the advanced 
hypotheses. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
PRIMITIVE creatures, such as lobsters, do not use extensive internal representations in the mind. 
Their neurons are “hardwired” for relatively few crudely defined situations and sensor signals almost 
directly wired to muscles. Although the intermediate neural circuits in invertebrates between sensory 
organs and muscles are plastic, the learning and adaptation that takes place amounts to forming simple 
stimulus-response connections that do not generalize to other situations. There is no creativity. With 
evolution of adaptive representations, the variety of objects and situations in the world that the mind can 
recognize grows tremendously. Adaptive representations imply that yesterday‟s representations may not 
fit today‟s reality, and learning mechanisms are necessary for adaptation. Moreover, adaptation becomes 
necessary, because without adaptation perception becomes impossible.  Therefore the knowledge 
instinct (KI), that is, the drive to adapt mental representations to the surrounding reality, had to evolve 
along with adaptivity. We discuss this mechanism, the mathematical reasons and experimental evidence 
that learning proceeds from vague to crisp representations [1-5]. 
 Without language, adaptivity is limited to what can be perceived by sensors and to a limited 
number of combinations of perceptions. Visual and other sensory cortex circuitries in higher animals are 
tremendously complex mechanisms. Still we suggest that animals cannot learn to generalize much 
beyond direct perceptions; consequently complex animal behavior has to be based on inborn 
mechanisms with minimal adaptations. We discuss the reason for this hypothesis and how it can be 
tested. 
With language, cultural evolution outpaced genetic evolution, knowledge accumulated fast, and 
a hierarchy of abstract representations evolved. Abstract thoughts in language are grounded in external 
society and kids by age 5 can talk about almost everything ([6], [7]). Learning language is guided by a 
variant of KI (the Language Instinct, LI; [8]), and proceeds from vague to crisp representations 
(including syntax and complex abstract thoughts). Whereas KI fits internal cognitive representations to 
sensor perceptions, LI fits internal representations of language (vague at birth) to external language. But 
LI does not connect language to the world. We discuss a mechanism connecting language to cognitive 
representations, so that matching cognitive representations to the world by KI is guided by language 
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([6], [7], [9]). This hypothesis is fundamental to understanding creativity, by means of understanding the 
difference between creative and heuristic thinking. We discuss its theoretical bases, experimental 
evidence, and future tests [10]. 
We emphasize that creativity is a matter of degree. Autonomous and unconscious working of KI 
usually is not called creativity. Conscious mental effort resulting in new understanding-representations 
in the mind of a single person is a creative process, even if this understanding is not new for a society; 
this is the distinction Boden [11] and others draw between personal creativity and historical creativity.  
Every normal kid understands surrounding language by the age of 5; these mechanisms are autonomous 
and non-creative. Yet even at 5 sometimes kids use language creatively: could this be studied 
scientifically? Reading and writing are not autonomously acquired skills. Skills acquired at an average 
level, with much tutoring and rote learning, usually are not called creativity. Should a better memory, 
quicker reactions, or faster speaking be called more creative? We emphasize the creative aspect of 
connecting language with cognition. 
Since the time of Aristotle [12], the ability to speak well has been identified with intelligence. 
Yet some people can be cognitively creative while possessing only average ability for expressing their 
thoughts in language. Of course the two sides of SAT tests acknowledge this. We discuss scientific 
approaches to studying this phenomenon. Are the two parts of SAT adequate for testing creativity? 
What can be deduced from contemporary models of the mind?  
The mind architecture has hierarchical structure, from elementary percepts to abstract thoughts. 
We suggest that creativity is manifest at higher levels. As mentioned, language is acquired early in life 
crisply and consciously at many hierarchical levels including the abstract ones, but we discuss why 
cognition at higher levels may remain fuzzy-vague. We discuss that crispness of language masks 
vagueness of cognition from our consciousness. Subjectively, ideas may be perceived as consciously 
understood, if we can talk about them. The paper discusses a mechanism by which crispness of language 
hides from the consciousness the vagueness of corresponding cognitive representations. It is obvious 
when watching kids: they talk well, but they do not “really” know what it means. In regards to highly 
abstract ideas, most of the time most adults are like kids. Therefore it takes more creativity to make crisp 
and conscious cognitive model-representations at higher levels. This hypothesis can be tested 
experimentally. 
 Creativity in a wide sense develops crisp cognitive representations corresponding to crispness of 
language, in other words, to understand the world and self at the level existing in language and culture. 
In a more narrow and refined sense creativity has several aspects. Scientific creativity develops 
cognitive representations, which surpass language in their adequacy to the world (and self). Writers 
formulate knowledge in language crisper than it has been formulated previously; new knowledge is 
created in this process if stronger connections to cognitive representations are achieved. As we discuss 
that requires connecting language with emotions. In this area, writers, poets, and composers use various 
means for similar goals: emotionally connecting language and cognition. 
Creativity, thus, involves not only conceptual knowledge but emotions as well. We discuss the 
role of emotions in cognition and identify specific emotions related to the KI and creativity ([2-4], [6], 
[13-17]). Higher up in the hierarchy of the mind, emotions and concepts are intermixed in a non-
differentiated fashion. Development of differentiated knowledge, especially at higher levels of the 
hierarchy, creates psychological tensions, that is, cognitive dissonances. These dissonances in the 
psyche interfere with unity, which is necessary for achieving higher goals, psychic health and sometimes 
even survival. To continue developing knowledge and to be able to cope with this multitude of 
dissonances, humans need the corresponding multitude of conscious “higher” emotions that help one to 
bring the “feelings” of the dissonances into consciousness, and then to cope with them. Poetry and 
music evolved for this purpose [18-20]. Closely related is a need to continue connecting language to 
cognition, which requires this same multitude of emotions ([7], [15]). This is the cognitive role of 
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poetry, songs, and musical theater. Correspondingly, there are emotional creativities of poets, 
composers, musicians, singers and also writers – they create new emotions necessary for being able to 
cope with the diversity of cultures – to connect language with cognition, and to continue the process of 
cultural evolution [15]. 
Cognitive representations include understanding and behavior. We discuss that the highest 
conceptual understanding relates to the beautiful. The highest of behavioral representations relate to the 
spiritually sublime [10]. 
The next section discusses mechanisms of KI, a contradiction between knowledge-maximizing 
mechanisms of creativity driving cultural evolution of human highest spiritual abilities on one hand and, 
on the other, heuristic mechanisms minimizing cognitive-effort as revealed by Tversky and Kahneman 
[21, 22]. Then we discuss mechanisms of interaction between cognition and language and relate them to 
the contradiction between KI and heuristics. The discussion section addresses experimental approaches 
to demonstrating the difference between heuristic and KI mechanisms, the role of emotions in creativity, 
and experimental approaches to demonstrating drive for creativity [17]. 
How far toward understanding creativity can we move based on contemporary models of the 
mind? 
 
II. HEURISTICS VS. THE KNOWLEDGE INSTINCT 
 
Research initiated by Tversky and Kahneman [21, 22] demonstrated that decision making is 
often irrational and based on heuristics, which may or may not be suitable to a particular situation. 
Humans often prefer fast decisions, saving effort, including mental effort, to original thinking. 
According to Maimonides [23], refusing original thinking and choosing a shortcut to the ready-made 
knowledge was the reason for expelling Adam from paradise. Maimonides‟ explanation was connected 
to contemporary cognitive science in [10].  
Fast decisions saving time and effort have clear evolutionary advantages. Efficient use of 
heuristics could be counted as “personal creativity.” But if irrationality and heuristics are fundamental to 
human decision making, what is the source of all human knowledge? Heuristics might be used well or 
poorly, but what is the source of heuristics? This source should be no less fundamental to human psyche 
than irrationality. We suggest that heuristics is a store of accumulated cultural knowledge, whereas the 
source of this knowledge is the KI. Heuristics originate in those relatively rare times when creative 
individuals use their KI and create new knowledge that turn useful for the rest of the society (creativity 
or “historical creativity”).    
Perlovsky and McManus [24], (see also [1] and [2]), developed a mathematical theory of the 
knowledge instinct (KI), the drive to make sense out of one‟s environment.  Their mathematical 
description of the KI involves maximizing similarity between mental representations-models and 
patterns in sensory signals. More generally, KI maximizes similarity between bottom-up and top-down 
signals, which is interpreted as knowledge. Top-down signals produced by mental representations, 
indexed by m at each hierarchical level. In neural terminology they prime receiving neurons, n, to 
recognize pattern Mm(n) in the bottom-up signals X(n). Mathematically, they predict the expected 
patterns in the bottom-up signals; the similarity between bottom-up signals X(n) and top-down signals 
Mm(n) ([1], [2]) is expressed as 
 
L({X},{M}) =  
 MmNn
r(m) l(X(n) | Mm(n)). (1) 
 
This similarity expression considers each top-level representation, m, as an alternative, a 
possibility of an object or situation m to be present among bottom-up signals n. Conditional similarities 
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l(X(n) | Mm(n)) can be modeled [25, 26] as 
 
l(X(n) | Mm(n)) =

D
i 1
pmi
xni
(1 – pmi)
(1-xni)
  .(2) 
 
Here, n indexes bottom-up signals, m indexes top-down signals, and i indexes their constituent 
components; e.g. features of a pattern, or objects making up a situation, or situations making up an 
abstract representations. A bottom-up signal xni indicates a presence of a component i in a bottom-up 
signal n, and a top-down signal pmi models a probability of a component i in a top-down signal m. Thus 
expressions (1) and (2) model similarity measures at every level of the mind hierarchy. The number of 
possible components, i, is denoted as D.  All possible associations between bottom-up signals, N, and 
top-down signals, M, are accounted for in similarity (1). This is a huge combinatorial number on the 
order of N
M
.  
As discussed in [1] and [2], this is the reason for the computational complexity encountered by 
most artificial intelligence, pattern recognition, and neural network algorithms since the 1950s. Such 
complexity is related to classical logic [27, 28], which is a part not only of logical rule systems, but also 
of those approaches specifically designed to overcome logical limitations.  Classical logic is used in 
training procedures of pattern recognition and neural network algorithms, and in fuzzy systems‟ 
selection of the degrees of fuzziness. This is the reason for the seemingly irresolvable computational 
complexity of most algorithms encountered for decades. The above references describe Neural 
Modeling Fields (NMF), a mathematical procedure that uses dynamic logic (DL) to overcome 
limitations of computational complexity. Resulting algorithms outperform previous approaches by 
orders of magnitude ([29-33]). Whereas classical logic involves crisp statements and thus is a static 
statement-logic, DL is a process-logic; it involves evolution of mental representations from vague-fuzzy 
to crisp. It describes emergence of approximately classical logic processes from illogical and fuzzy 
neural processes in the brain ([7], [35]). Neuroimaging experiments demonstrated that visual perceptions 
in the human brain follow predictions of NMF-DL ([1], [2], [5], [7], [16]). Thus at the basic level of 
visual perception, DL models a mechanism of KI.  
At lower levels of the brain hierarchy KI operates autonomously, serving as a foundation of 
perception. However, our hypothesis in this paper is that at higher levels KI operations are not 
autonomous, they require conscious effort, and they serve as foundations for creativity. KI at higher 
levels becomes a drive for creativity.   This is because existing concepts or combinations of concepts are 
often inadequate for resolving cognitive and emotional dissonances between top-down and bottom-up 
signals between different high levels.  The roles of several prefrontal and subcortical regions in forming, 
breaking, and changing behavioral and decision rules are discussed in [34]. 
At lower levels of perception there is no competition among mechanisms of decision making. 
Perception cannot operate heuristically; higher animals as well as human beings have to use DL 
mechanisms of KI to be able to orient in the surrounding world. In the next section we discuss decision 
making at higher cognitive levels and relate a competition between KI and Kahneman-Tversky heuristic 
mechanisms to a competition between cognitive and language mechanisms. 
 
 
III. KI AND HEURISTICS VS. COGNITION AND LANGUAGE 
 
Let us repeat that at lower levels of perception KI operates autonomously. This is similar in 
animals and in humans. Here we relate ability for higher level abstract thinking to language, and in turn, 
relate language to a competition between KI and heuristic thinking.  
As argued in [15] and [36], higher level abstract thinking is only possible due to language. To 
5 
 
 
model this ability we have to consider mechanisms of interaction between cognition and language, and 
their parallel hierarchy, Fig. 1 ([2], [6], [14], [31]). NMF-DL describes language similar to cognition by 
the hierarchy of levels maximizing similarity (1). A newborn human mind does not have specific models 
for concrete words or syntactic rules. Instead, it contains vague “placeholders” that in the process of 
learning would acquire specific contents (words, rules) matching the language spoken around. Similarly, 
a newborn human mind does not have specific models for concrete objects or situations; it contains 
vague “placeholders” that in the process of learning would acquire specific contents (images, relations) 
matching surrounding world. Interaction between cognition and language is modeled mathematically by 
the mechanism of dual models. While language and cognitive models in the newborn brain are vague 
placeholders, the neural connections between these future models are inborn ([6], [15]). Therefore 
human brain-mind does not have to “figure out” which words go with which objects (this 
mathematically unsolvable problem can be solved using the dual model, [37-41]). As vague 
placeholders acquire concrete contents, connections between words and objects, phrases and situations 
are already in place. This is the mechanism of the dual model, which enables language-cognition 
interaction. 
Note that as Fig. 1 indicates, language is acquired from surrounding language ready-made at all 
hierarchical levels. This is the reason kids of 5 years old can talk about complex abstract ideas, which 
they do not yet have experience to “really understand.” But note also that cognitive experience is 
acquired from the surrounding world only at the very bottom of the hierarchy, at the level of sensory 
perceptions. Learning at this level (perception) is possible without language, and animals can perceive 
objects, and to some degree situations. But learning abstract ideas, which are combinations of elements 
of many situations, combinations that cannot be directly perceived, is impossible from direct experience. 
The reason is that the number of combinations is too large, much larger than any individual experience 
will enable to learn useful abstract ideas from random sets of objects and relations. Only due to guidance 
from language, abstract cognitive models could acquire concrete contents. KI drives every human brain-
mind to develop abstract cognitive contents corresponding to language models. 
Higher up in the hierarchy cognitive models remain vaguer and less concrete. Learning-
understanding and creating new models continue throughout life. Higher in the hierarchy the 
autonomous KI gradually turns into drive for creativity. It becomes less autonomous and more 
dependent on individual conscious effort. This is why there are significant differences between people in 
how well they “really understand” the contents of the spoken language. Our hypothesis is that one 
“really understands” when his or her cognitive models become crisp and specific corresponding to 
crispness of language. This hypothesis can be experimentally tested. We would emphasize that “real 
understanding” requires more than just crispness and concreteness. An abstract idea involves more than 
one crisp and concrete content; the drive for creativity strives for multiple differentiated contents, which 
have to be properly related and unified. 
It follows from the above discussion that the drive for creativity has an inborn autonomous 
component; however, this inborn component weakens at the higher levels. Language, while providing 
guidance to the development of abstract cognitive models, also creates impediments to this process. To 
understand the nature of this difficulty, let us consider cognition at the lower level of perception, where 
it does not involve language. Close your eyes for 2 seconds and try to imagine an object that you have 
clearly seen in front of your eyes. The imagined object is vague, not as crisp and clear and not as 
consciously perceived as the object with opened eyes. Bar et al. [5] performed a similar and much more 
detailed experiment using brain imaging. The imagined vague object is created on the visual cortex by 
projections of mental representations, top-down signals. When you open your eyes, the object again is 
perceived crisp and clear, and it is impossible to perceive the vague imagined object with opened eyes. 
With opened eyes, crisp and consciously perceived projections from the retina, which are created by 
interacting bottom-up and top-down signals, mask less conscious and vaguer top-down signals. Similar 
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processes occur at higher level. Language models act as “eyes” for cognition of abstract concepts. 
Because language models are crisp and conscious, they mask vague and unconscious abstract cognitive 
models. Therefore it is difficult to perceive that cognition is vague and inadequate. Every step towards 
more crisp and conscious cognitive abstract models requires conscious creative effort. Still, evolution of 
human knowledge and culture confirms that drive for creativity makes this development possible. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Hierarchical integrated language-cognition MF system. At each level in a hierarchy there are similarities, 
models, and mechanisms of learning of language and cognitive models ([15]). The dual models (thick arrow) integrate 
language and cognition. Mathematically, similarities are integrated as products of language and cognition similarities. 
Initial models are fuzzy placeholders, so integration of language and cognition is sub-conscious. Association variables 
depend on both language and cognitive models and signals. Therefore language model learning helps cognitive model 
learning and v.v. High-layer abstract cognitive concepts are grounded in abstract language concepts similarities. 
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Kahneman-Tversky heuristics. Drive for creativity makes possible the improvement of abstract 
cognitive models. Yet, it takes much effort to overcome heuristic knowledge accumulated in language. 
Irrationality and heuristic thinking, according to the hypothesis of this paper, correspond to thinking 
with crisp language models, while the corresponding cognitive models remain vaguer and less 
conscious. 
 
 
IV. DISCUSSION 
 
Steps toward mathematical modeling of interacting heuristic thinking and cognitive drive have 
been taken in [10] and [42].  Based on various fMRI results, we suggested in [10] that operations of 
heuristic mechanisms tend to activate the amygdala, a part of the brain that has changed little from other 
mammals to humans.  On the other hand, creative operations of the knowledge instinct tend to activate 
executive regions of prefrontal cortex, a part of the brain whose complexity has grown exponentially in 
humans.  Yet the roles of those regions are complex because connections between the amygdala and two 
regions of prefrontal cortex (orbitofrontal and anterior cingulate) are also implicated in higher-level 
emotional responses based on actual or expected consequences of stimuli or actions (see [42] for 
review).  Hence those same connections likely play a role in the aesthetic emotional responses that 
accompany the intuitive elements of creativity. 
Experimental tests of this hypothesis are ongoing. Here we continue developing this hypothesis 
by suggesting specific roles of cognition and language. We suggest that thinking by using ready-made 
heuristics involves language brain centers to larger degrees than original thinking using cognitive 
mechanisms.  The connection between heuristics and language could be mediated by neural connections 
between cortical language centers and amygdala (either direct or through the thalamus). Whereas 
heuristics involve vague and less conscious cognitive representations, original thinking involves crisper 
and more conscious cognitive representations. This hypothesis can be experimentally tested using 
procedures similar to those used in referenced literature. 
According to the theory of drives and emotions [13], every drive involves specific emotional 
neural signals indicating satisfaction or dissatisfaction of this drive. Specific emotions associated with 
KI were identified as aesthetic emotions ([4], [6], [7], [16], [18-20], [43], [44]). Experimental 
confirmation of aesthetic emotions related to satisfaction of KI was documented in [17]. This hypothesis 
has been further developed with our theory of differentiated KI, which in this paper we identify with the 
drive for creativity. It has been suggested that all inconsistencies in the body of knowledge, as well as 
all contradictions between knowledge and other instincts, create cognitive dissonances which are 
perceived emotionally as a multiplicity of aesthetic emotions. Maintaining unity of the psyche along 
with differentiated knowledge requires highly developed differentiated emotions, which are created in 
individuals and cultures by music ([6], [18-20]). The related form of creativity is a province of poets, 
composers, and singers. Affinity between emotions of cognitive dissonance and musical emotions is 
being tested by several research groups of psychologists and cognitive musicologists. This is a wide 
field for future research. 
Also, an important part of the drive for creativity is the sense that we have achieved an 
understanding through our own efforts.  Why should satisfaction of the KI through generating an idea on 
one‟s own provide us with a particular pleasure that we do not obtain as much from leaning about the 
same idea from someone else, or from a book or web site?  The answer to this question probably 
involves a greater understanding of the nature of the self and how we differentiate the self from others.  
Aside from a general sense that the self is closely involved with prefrontal cortex, and that different and 
adjacent prefrontal regions are implicated in emotional and cognitive parts of the sense of self [43], the 
neural basis for the self-other distinction is largely unknown and is another field for future research. 
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The theory developed in this paper and others advances hypotheses about the nature of the 
highest aesthetic emotions of the beautiful and sublime ([2-4], [6], [7], [16-20], [44-47]. In the mind 
hierarchy, as shown in Fig. 1, concepts-representations at every higher level have evolved in cultural 
evolution for the purpose of creating a unified, general meaning of lower level concepts. Mental 
representations at the highest levels of the hierarchy strive for creating a unity of the entire human 
experience. While language representations at these highest levels have been developed by artists, 
philosophers, and theologians over millennia, cognitive representations remain vague and unconscious. 
Every step toward creating crisper contents of these representations improves understanding of the 
meaning of the entire life experience in its unity and is felt as emotions of the beautiful. Improving 
representations of behavior realizing the beautiful in one‟s life is felt as emotions of the sublime. 
Experimental tests of this hypothesis are a subject of future research. 
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